To begin with, it will be convenient to note the implications of Platonic diaeresis. It is true that this operation of Platonic dialectic is not the same as the logical progress from premise to inference. Genus and species are ontological rather than logical terms. And yet it may be assumed that if Plato's logic anticipated the Aristotelian distinction between the higher and the lower, the same topographical perspective should also be apparent in the area studied by diaeresis. It will be all the more striking, then, if we can show that diaeresis does not make provision for a vertical hierarchy of Being, or, at least, that Plato's discussion does not suggest that such a hierarchy is reflected in the diaeretic procedure so as to shape it in its image.
Modern discussions of Plato's analysis via division and collection often refer to higher or superordinate and lower or subordinate γένη, μέγιστα γένη is sometimes rendered as "highest forms."® And elegant stemmata are devised.
spreading from the 'top of the page to the bottom, to reproduce the up-or downward movement of the dialectical process. But if we look closely at the relevant passages, both at those where Plato practices the technique of division and collection, and at those in which he states his method, we find that the directional implications of the process are either indifferent or horizontal. That is to say, to the extent that Plato conceives the diaeretic procedure as moving, it moves on one plane or level.
Here is a listing of the principal passages in question, with the key words, the topographical orientation implied, and occasional further comment.
Phaedrus 265D -266C: diaeresis operates by dividing the entity to be analyzed into a left (In' άριστερδ τεμνδμενος) and a right part (είς τά èv δεξι£). Orientation: not vertical. Hence such terms as "sub-form" and "Ínfima species" should be eliminated from the discussion of diaeresis passages.9
Sophist 253ϊ analysis consists of showing which γένη associate with one another and which do not (... ποια ... συμφωνεί ... ποια ... ού δέχεται) and which γένη have another "stretched through" them (διατεταμένην) so as to con tain them (περιεχομένας). Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 262A -263B: analysis should operate by cutting through the middle (δια μέσον ... Ιέναι τέμνοντας). Orientation: inconclusive., Politicus 268C: analysis involves disengaging the item to be isolated from connected and related γένη "poured around" it (περικεχυμένους αύτ$). Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 275E: the choice of the proper inclusive concept will allow us to "wrap up" (περικαλόπτειν) one species along with the others with which it constitutes a genus. Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 285A-C: analysis requires orderly procedure, especially the grouping of separate elements into the one comprehensive genus to which they belong (τα οίκεϊα ... ερξας ... περιβ&ληται). Orientation: indifferent. Philebus 16D -18D: the analogy of grammatical and musical analysis shows that philosophical analysis must interpose various stages between the conception of the one and the conception of the infinite number containing the one (μίαν Ιδέαν περί παντδς ... Ινουσαν). Orientation: indifferent. Sophist 2 6 5 E -266a : In a progressive division of a γένος into 2, 4, 8, etc,, parts, the division is made alternately by drawing a vertical line (κατά πλάτος) and a horizontal line (κατα μήκος). Orientation: indifferent.
Other references could be added, but the result would be the same, name ly, that logical implication is regarded by Plato not as subsumption but either as containment ■ -that is to say, the genus envelops the species -or as division -that is, the species constitutes the right or left half of the genus. The movement experienced in the transition from genus to species or, in the case of collection, from species to genus is not in a single instance characterized as a descent from or an ascent to the genus.
One possible answer to this would be that the ε' ίδη may not be organized in a vertical hierarchy, but that the Ideas of Plato's middle dialogues are, and that such terms as δπδθεσις, &ρχή and έπαγωγή, with their well-known connotations, speak palpably for a vertical perspective* έπαγωγή may be dis pensed with out of hand. Even Robinson, who insists that Plato practices έπαγωγή, admits that he is not aware of it as a logical procedure, and has in fact no term for it. Does Plato use induction? The boundary line sepa rating induction from analogy is of course tenuous. But "all that business about cobblers and cleaners and cooks and doctors," as Callicles calls it, suggests that when Plato refers to practical reality, he appeals to some sort of intuition rather than the powers of reasoning. However that may be, Plato does not use the term έπαγωγή, and that relieves us of the need to dis cuss it.
As for ύπδθεσις and its near-equivalent άρχή, the situation is very com plex. Robinson himself has done much to shed light on the obscure standing of hypothesis in Plato. According to him, the case is the reverse of that Obtaining in the matter of induction: "Plato discussed but rarely used the hypothetical method," Since, therefore, we have Plato's methodology but little of his application, obscurities and even inconsistencies in the former leave matters somewhat doubtful. This much, however, is clear. A hypothesis is something posited -cf. Aristotle's κείμενον -as a preliminary assump tion, as a basis·*·® for further logical operations which may either analyze the assumption itself or depend on it for the analysis of other assumptions. Normally the latter is the case, i.e., the hypothesis is a premise rather than a demonstrand.*-*· Broadly speaking, then, "hypothesizing is positing with a view to future action." Often the assumption which forms the point of departure for further investigation is a κοινδν άξιώμενον, a statement tacitly assumed to be true by all.
The important question which now arises is this: does the ύπδ-part of the word δπδθεσις signify that this basic assumption is conceived of as ly ing under and thus supporting the logical edifice constructed from it? Let us call this the U-(= under) perspective, to contrast with the A-(= above) perspective whereby the assumption is conceived of as lying above the conclu sion, Now on the face of it, it would seem likely that the ύπδ points to a U-perspective. But according to Robinson and most Platonists that cannot be, for a hypothesis to be useful must refer to a higher reality than the propo sitions deduced from it. Hence Plato's hypothesis, like Aristotle's premise, and equally paradoxically so, must be pictured as vaulting above the conclu sions and deductions which aré suspended below it.
To render this unlikely notion palatable, Robinson undertakes, in the wake of Burnet,*-2 to demonstrate that the first sense of hypothesis was intellectual, not architectural or physical in any way.13 His reasoning is that if the word had ever "borne some such sense as 'physical foundation', Plato would hardly have written the phrase &λλην αυ ύπδθεσιν ύποθέμενος ήτις των άνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο (Phd. 101D)j for it would have carried the absurd suggestion of 'placing as base whatever base seemed best of those above'!" As we shall see later, Robinson's interpretation of the Phaedo passage, though commonly accepted, is not the only possible one. At Republic 511B, where Plato does understand hypothesis in the sense of a physical stepping stone -άλλα τ$ οντι δποθδσεις, οΧον έπιβάσεις τε καί δρμάς ... -Burnet and Robinson suspect a pun. But even granted that Plato is speaking humorously here, the passage proves that he felt the δπδ-part of the term strongly enough to allow his conception of logical procedure, at this point, to be guided by it or at least to make allowance for it.
Though there is no uncontested case of Plato using δπδθεσις in the sense of "foundation," other writers supply us with the required supplementary in formation. Closest to that of Plato is, perhaps, the usage of the Hippocratic writers. For instance, the writer On Ancient Medicine (chs. 1; 13J 15) uses δπδθεσις to refer to one of the opposites -το θερμήν and τδ ψυχρόν, etc. -■ alleged to determine health, as well as to the assumption of the operation of such an opposite. The spatial perspective is not entirely clear, but it cannot be doubted that these opposites should be ranged closely with the Empedoclean Ριζώματα, and as ¡Ριζώματα they would of course realize their δπδ-fünction to the fullest.
Other writers who capitalize on the δπδ-force of the word δπδθεσις are Aeschines (3.76) and Polybius (15.35.2). But our clearest evidence for the dynamic implications of δπδθεσις occurs in a popular text, and a simile, to boot. Demosthenes 2.10.5: "Just as a house and a ship and other such structures require the strongest foundations, so the άρχαί and δποθέσεις of actions must be true and just." Here there can be no doubt; a hypothesis is analogous to the foundation of a house, not to its roof. And this, I suggest, was the natural significance of the word δπδθεσις, before its mean ing was obscured in a manner to be described directly; a foundation upon which to erect a superstructure of some sort, a broad basis on which things of lesser extent but greater concreteness are supported,L ogical progression, therefore, naturally leads from the hypothesis below to the inferences above. But there is another way of looking at logical pro gression. It may be pictured as leading forward horizontally from the start to the finish of a sentence or argument. This perspective is well illustrated by the usage of Xenophon Memor. 4.6.13: έπι την δπδθεσιν έπανηγεν άν πάντα τον λδγον ωδε .... The understanding is that the hypothesis, the subject or foundation of the discussion, had been voiced, or should have been voiced, at the beginning of the conversation. A "getting down to fundamentals" is, therefore, a "going back" to the beginning. Here the horizontal advance of the discussion has imposed its stamp on the topography of δπδθεσις. In most cases it is a relatively simple matter to distinguish between this perspective and the perspective which mirrors the structural concept outlined above.
After these few preliminary remarks, we must now turn to some of the passages in which Plato exemplifies his understanding of δπδθεσις. Again our list is representative rather than exhaustive. As before, I shall state the references, cite crucial words, and indicate the contribution of the passage to the subject under discussion. The actual word δπδθεσις does not occur in all of the passages cited. Sometimes αρχή takes its place; sometimes there is no technical term to be found. Not all of the passages describe what we would term a logical procedure. But the process envisaged is always the same; the movement from general assumption to specific conclusion. It is this movement which according to the usual interpretation should be a move ment άνωθεν κάτω. 
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Phaedo 100A3 -101E3: άλλ* οδν δη ταδτ$ γε δρμησα, και δποθέμενος . ·* δ* μεν &ν μσι δοκη τοδτ^ συμφωνειν τίθημι &ς άληθη ' όντα .... 101D3: et δέ τις αύτης της δποθέσεως εχοιτο, χαίρειν έφης αν ... εως αν τα άπ* έκείνης δρμηθέντα σκέψαιο .... έπειδη δε έκείνης αύτης δέοι σε διδδναι λδγον, άσαύτως άν διδοίης, άλλην αδ ύπδθεσιν δποθέμενος ^τις των άνωθεν βέλτιστη φαίνοιτο, εως έπί τι Ικανόν ελθοις .... ¥e should note that this last passage, as so many others dealing with hypothesis, employs a verb of motion or pro gression, in this case δρμδω and δρμ&ομαι. The usual sense of the word is "to move forward," in a horizontal direction. The direction may occasionally be vertical; but in that case it is likely to be upward rather than downward, for the simple reason that the word denotes willed rather than automatic motion. And yet in this passage δρμδομαί has been interpreted as downward motion, the reason being that hypothesis in the Phaedo is clearly associated with the Ideas, and the Ideas are highest. However, the argument is not from Ideas to sensibles and back but, according to Socrates, from Ideas to Ideas; and there is no evidence to indicate, at least in this passage, that one Idea is higher than another. Thus the more comprehensive or basic hypothesis should not be pictured as lying above a hypothesis entailed by it or generated by it. Never does Plato use such a phrase as έκ 60ο δποθέσεων ηρτηταi^6 or a similar verb of suspension in connexion with the hypothesis method. But we can go further than that, and suggest that in the Phaedo Plato seems to conceive of the premise as lying below the conclusion, that is to say, that Plato adopts the U-perspective, This emerges from the words: άλλην αδ δπδθεσιν δποθέμενος ητις των άνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο . ...P lato*s language here points to the notion of an inverted pyramid, with the more comprehensive hypothesis lying at the bottom, and the δρμηθέντα radiating upward from each hypothesis, τα άνωθεν is merely another way of saying τά δρμηθέντα. We translate as follows: "placing below hypothesis X another hypothesis Y which would seem to be the best (hypothesis) of the (propositions) above it," that is, which would account best for X and other statements on the same level. Usually the genitive των άνωθεν is explained as a partitive genitive. It is, however, equally possible to take it as an objective genitive, referring to the conclusions generated by the premise. Cf, the Aristotelian parallel given above, note 17. The word βελτίστη in the sense of "most effective" may seem unusual, but the functional connotation of άγαθδς is well known. The phrase as it stands is awkward, but the stylistic difficulties seem to me less decisive than the difficulties of interpretation which result from the traditional assumption of a "higher hypothesis." To imply, as one would have to on the old assumption, that there are many hypoth eses of a more universal character, any of which might be relevant to the ar gument, is to render the method itself almost unworkable. The plural των makes better sense if it can be supposed to refer to the several conclusions inferrable from a particular premise chosen with the assistance of common sense and synoptic experience.Î f we now draw the balance of the passages we have discussed, it appears that most of them do not tell us anything about the direction of the activity prompted by hypothesis. Two, perhaps three instances favor the horizontal perspective; here the eye focusses on the progress of the operation rather than on the mutual relations between the terms of the operation. One passage speaks for the U-perspectivej here the etymological meaning of δπδθεσις seems to rise more fully to the consciousness. And finally, there is no evidence of the A-perspective.
It now remains to investigate some passages from the Republic« particu larly from the section containing the allegory of the Cave and the diagram of the Divided Line, These passages have been reserved for the final part of our discussion because they appear, at first glance, to occasion the greatest difficulty. It is only natural, given the perspectival connotations of Cave and Line, that the Platonic distinction between "up" and "down" should here find its most marked expression. We should, however, remember that this perspective refers to the distinction between levels of reality, or rather between reality and the various kinds of non-real, and to the distinction between the correlate mental activities, such as knowledge and belief. The method of hypothetical reasoning, on the other hand, functions on only one level of mental activity, and is concerned with only one level of reality, viz,, the Ideas (5HC1-2·), whether these Ideas be visualized in their pure state, as in dialectic, or less purely, as in mathematics and other sciences (510B4 ff.).
First, a preliminary passage. Rep. 437A6-9: ·_·* ύποθέρενοi είς τδ πρδσθευ προίομεν, δμολογήσαντες, εάν ποτέ άλλη φαν$ ταύτα ή' τούτη, πάντα ήμΐν τα άπδ τούτου συμβαίνοντα λελυμένα εσεσθαι. In this concise description of argument on the basis of postulates, the perspective is horizontal, or at best undetermined. What makes the passage important is the fact that the quotations to be studied directly refer by and large to just such reasoning as is contemplated here, in language very similar to the terms used here. For this analysis of non-dialectic hypothetical argument, cf. above, 510B5-9. There is, however, one difference between this statement and other statements we have discussed: άρχή is now distinguished from ύπδθεσις; it is equated with the άνυπδθετον. Mathematical demonstration is contrasted with the genuine dialectical method which leads to the άνυπδθετον and which is outlined in 511B3 ff. Mathemati cal reasoning functions on the second highest level of mental activity. Compared with pure dialectic, it is a swamp which does not permit a man to get his head free. That is to say, in the hierarchy of the sciences mathematics is so far below dialectic that it might as well be thought to be located in the quagmire of belief. There is no transfer or transition possible between mathematical and dialectical reasoning. "To get above the (mathematical) hypotheses" is tantamount to entering an entirely different arena of logical endeavor. ... δια δε τδ μή Ιπ* άρχήν άνελθδντες σκοπεϊν. The mental activity described is that of dialectic, as contrasted with that of mathematics and the inferior sciences. It is difficult to decide whether the words, and expecially the prepositions employed in the compound verbs, refer to a vertical or a horizontal perspective. The horizontal or "progress of argument" sig nificance of ανα-and κατά-compounds is well known and has already been in stanced,^ τελευτή, I suspect, refers to the end of the supreme deductive argument, just as αρχή refers to its beginning, or to the end of the ensuing synthesis. What complicates the situation is the image, probably humorous, of the stepping stones, which seem to indicate an "up" and "down" orientation. To repeat, when Plato, in his analysis of the Divided Line and Cave, talks about hypothesis, αρχή, τελευτή, etc,, his language is usually non committal on the score of perspective. Where he does speak of "up" and "down" he is ranking scientific hypotheses in the second highest division, below those of dialectic. Once, 511B5 ff., the ontological and epistemological context does, on one interpretation, seem to color the logical perspective, and he appears to believe that those hypotheses which bring a man closer to the άνυπδθετον are seen as higher than more mediate hypotheses. But we have shown that the language need not carry this meaning, and that the similar phrasing of other passages speaks against the adoption of this interpretation.
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence for Plato regarding the argu ment by hypothesis as leading downward from premise to inference is nil. It may be wondered why Plato was misunderstood so soon, notably by Aristotle, One explanation may be that Plato provides few examples of the technique in action. Another may be that Plato's followers regarded him as a metaphysician first and last, and could not separate his logic from his ontology. The prob lem calls for a close investigation.
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